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INTRODUCTION 
In their response to the cross appeal of General Biometrics, Inc. ("GenBio"), 
Robert A. Condie and James Yarter assert that they did not breach their fiduciary obligations 
(App. Rep. Br. 17-22) and that sanctions are inappropriate because their appeal is well 
grounded. App. Rep. Br. 22-24, 2-17. Neither submission has merit. 
Appellants' response brief effectively concedes that Condie and Yarter have 
violated their fiduciary obligations. And, far from demonstrating that the appeal is meritorious, 
the brief confirms that Appellants' arguments are frivolous: the trial court's factual finding that 
there was "no meeting of the minds" (R. 1588) imposed a clear marshaling requirement that 
Appellants previously ignored and now attempt to evade, and the other issues they present lack 
good faith factual or precedential support. GenBio should be awarded damages for the fiduciary 
derelictions of its former officers and Condie and Yarter should be sanctioned for prosecuting 
a frivolous appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
L APPELLANTS, BY ADMITTEDLY PLANNING TO ACQUIRE GENBIO'S ONLY 
PROFITABLE ASSETS WHILE SERVING ON THE CORPORATE BOARD, BREACHED 
THEIR DUTIES OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
AS set out in GenBio's opening brief (at 43-47), and not refuted by Appellants 
(who cite no authority to counter GenBio's statement of the law of fiduciary obligations), Utah 
law imposes strict duties upon corporate fiduciaries — including former corporate fiduciaries. 
Condie and Yarter, by admittedly planning to acquire GenBio's only profitable assets while 
serving on the corporate board (App. Rep. Br. 21), and by thereafter resigning from the board 
and attempting to purchase those assets without full disclosure, breached these clear fiduciary 
obligations. 
A. GenBio Has Properly Marshaled The Evidence 
Perhaps because their fiduciary breach is so clear, Condie's and Yarter's principal 
submission is that GenBio did not properly "martial [sic, marshal] the evidence" on the cross 
appeal. App. Rep. Br. 20. This submission is insubstantial. 
To begin with, the cross appeal does not — as Appellants submit (App. Rep. Br. 
1) -- raise a simple issue of fact reviewable for clear error. As set out in GenBio's opening brief 
(GenBio Br. 2-3), the fiduciary duty question raised by the cross appeal involves a mixed 
question of law and fact: that is, "whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given 
rule of law." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The precise question is whether 
Condie's and Yarter's conduct comes within the reach of the "strict" and "rigidly enforced" rule 
that former corporate fiduciaries may not "subject themselves to any temptations to serve their 
own interest in preference to the interest of the [corporation]." Elggren v. Woolley. 228 P. 906, 
909 (Utah 1924). 
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GenBio, of course, believes that Condie's and Yarter's actions fall well within the 
Elggren rule. The trial court's contrary conclusion, however, is not reviewable merely for 
"clear error." App. Rep. Br. 1. Rather, this mixed law/fact questn is "reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being [predominantly] a fact determination 
reviewable for clear error." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
Furthermore, and contrary to Appellants' submission, GenBio has not "reneg[ed] 
on its duty to martial [sic, marshal] the evidence" on the cross appeal. App. Rep. Br. 17. That 
duty — and the obligation it imposes upon counsel — is fully set out in GenBio's opening brief 
(at 24-29). Essentially, the marshaling requirement imposes the obligation to gather all evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings (Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 
1993)) and then, "[a]fter constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, . . . ferret 
out a fatal flaw." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 
1991). GenBio has performed both tasks. 
On pages 18-19 of their response brief, Condie and Yarter set forth the trial 
court's findings that supposedly exonerate them from breach of fiduciary duty. Essentially, 
those findings establish that Condie and Yarter conceived of their purchase plans while serving 
on the GenBio Board, but resigned prior to commencing earnest negotiations. App. Rep. Br. 
18-19 (quoting R. 1594-97). Those findings also establish that Condie and Yarter were 
unsuccessful in their purchase efforts, and had no information that was not available to other 
members of the GenBio Board. IcL All evidence supporting these findings is set out in 
GenBio's opening brief.1 GenBio, therefore, has not failed to marshal the appropriate record 
for consideration of its cross appeal. 
GenBio Br. 21 (summarizing evidence and citing to subsections (B)(2) and (3) of the Statement of 
the Case). 
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GenBio, furthermore, has "ferretfted] out a fatal flaw" in the legal conclusion that 
the trial court (and Condie and Yarter) would draw from the above findings. West Valley City, 
supra. 818 P.2d at 1315. The above findings do establish that Condie and Yarter were not 
successful in their attempt to abscond with GenBio's only profitable assets. They do not, 
however, establish that Condie's and Yarter's conduct was legally blameless. 
The trial court found that, because the "fiduciary duty of loyalty" and the 
"doctrine of corporate opportunity" merely forbid "a corporate director from acquiring for his 
own benefit an opportunity that would have been valuable and germane to the corporation's 
business," Condie and Yarter did not breach "any fiduciary duties when they decided to 
investigate the possible purchase of the MRC Division." R. 1597-98 (emphasis added). 
According to the trial court, even Condie's and Yarter's actions in "establish[ing] a competing 
corporation and urging GenBio to sell the MRC Division in such a manner that would have been 
detrimental to GenBio and its stockholders" was not a breach because it did not result in actual 
acquisition. R. 1598. 
This legal analysis - that only a completed acquisition results in fiduciary breach -
- is erroneous. And, once the applicable law is correctly understood, it is quite clear that 
Appellants' actions "comeQ within the reach of [that] rule of law." State v. Pena. supra. 869 
P.2d at 936. Appellants' "martialing" arguments, therefore, are plainly insufficient to avoid the 
merits of GenBio's cross appeal. 
B. Appellants' Fiduciary Breaches Are Apparent 
As noted, the trial court found that directors are liable for breach of fiduciary duty 
only when they actually acquire a corporate opportunity contrary to the interests of the 
corporation. R. 1597-98. Contrary to Condie's and Yarter's unsupported claim, this is hardly 
a "misrepresentation" of the trial court's ruling, nor is it a ruling that the trial court made "in 
passing." App. Rep. Br. 22.2 The trial court expressly concluded that the law merely forbids 
former corporate fiduciaries "from acquiring for [their] own benefit" a valuable corporate 
opportunity. R. 1597-98 (emphasis added). Unfortunately for Condie and Yarter, however, the 
scope of their fiduciary obligations is much broader. 
Corporate directors are "bound by the same rules of good faith, full disclosure, 
and fair dealing as surrounds the trustee in dealing with the cestui que trust." Glen Allen 
Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co.. 296 P. 231, 240 (Utah 1931). These obligations, 
moreover, are breached by fiduciaries who merely attempt to harm their corporate mentor -
even after the formal corporate relationship has ceased. "The essence of the wrong [is] in the 
acquiring of information while the relation of confidence existed, terminating the relation and 
immediately thereafter using the information so acquired against the interest of [the corporation.] 
2Counsel for Appellants are understandably unhappy that GenBio's opening brief points out the 
numerous times their opening brief misquotes, ignores and/or contorts the record. See generally GenBio 
Br. 47-49 & note 62. This undoubtedly accounts for the claims in their response brief that GenBio has 
made similar misrepresentations. See App. Rep. Br. 16-17 (asserting that GenBio has misrepresented 
Appellants' prior assertions that the trial court's findings were not inconsistent); App. Rep. Br. 22 
(asserting that GenBio has misrepresented the holding of the district court on fiduciary duty). 
As will be set out in Section 11(B)(4), below, Appellants did previously argue that the 
now-supposedly "inconsistent" findings were completely "consistent." And, Appellants' assertion that 
GenBio has "misrepresented" the trial court's understanding of the law of fiduciary obligations is wrong. 
Opposing counsel's primary legal argument was that, because the acquisition was unsuccessful, there was 
no fiduciary breach. June 9 Tr. 207 (just as "there's no harm in asking," there is "no harm in offering;" 
although Condie and Yarter "tried to enforce an agreement," the sale wasn't made" so "there's been no 
damage to these people out of this offer"). The trial court, moreover, expressly relied upon this 
reasoning in making its oral ruling. June 10 Tr. 54 (although an offer to purchase was made, when "it 
went to the board," they "didn't get board approval. And so there really was no breach of corporate 
opportunity or breach of fiduciary duty."). Furthermore, contrary to opposing counsels' bald claim that 
"[i]n the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law . . . absolutely no statement is made that 
because the deal was not ultimately consummated, there could not have been any breach of fiduciary 
duties" (App. Br. 22), that is precisely what the trial court held. R. 1597-98 (holding that the duty of 
loyalty and doctrine of corporate opportunity "forbid[] a corporate director from acquiring" valuable 
corporate assets) (emphasis added). 
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Glen Allen Mining Co.. 296 P. at 240. Condie and Yarter have unequivocally breached these 
obligations. 
Appellants' response brief asserts that, "[e]ven though Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter 
may have conceived of their plan to purchase the MRC Division while they were still directors, 
there is nothing improper about that." App. Rep. Br. 21. There is, however, plenty "improper 
about that." Id. Corporate fiduciaries, while serving in their official posts, and in any dealings 
with the corporation thereafter, "are to consider, not their private interests, but that of the 
[corporation]. . . . This rule is so strict and so rigidly enforced that the law will not permit these 
officials to subject themselves to any temptations to serve their own interest in preference to the 
interest of the [corporation]." Elggren v. Woolley. 228 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah 1924)(emphasis 
added). 
By acknowledging that they instigated their acquisition while corporate directors 
and continued their efforts after resigning, Condie's and Yarter's own brief effectively concedes 
their fiduciary breach. App. Rep. Br. 21. Moreover, and despite their feeble (and unsupported) 
assertion that GenBio "knew very well who was attempting the purchase" (App. Rep. Br. 21), 
the record establishes beyond peradventure that all of Condie's and Yarter's efforts were 
undertaken secretly, without any (let alone "full") disclosure.3 This Court should reverse the 
trial court's conclusion that fiduciaries violate their obligations only when they actually acquire 
^ o diffuse their conceded breach, Condie and Yarter assert - without citation to the record or other 
support ~ that "[u]pon making the offer to purchase the MRC Division, both Mr. Gephart and Mr. 
Townsen knew very well who was attempting the purchase." App. Rep. Br. 21. The record, however, 
establishes that neither Gephart, Townsen nor anyone else at GenBio knew that C&Y Corporation - the 
entity which offered to purchase the MRC Division - consisted of Condie and Yarter until after suit was 
filed. June 2 Tr. 171; June 9 Tr. 123. Condie and Yarter, furthermore, repeatedly admitted on the 
witness stand that they kept their purchase plans (and their identities) secret. June 2 Tr. 68, 126-27, 167, 
170-72; June 3 Tr. 194-95. See also D. Exh. 15 (Condie writes that he did not "indicate[] our desire 
to buy the North Salt Lake company" to GenBio employees). 
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valuable corporate assets and remand this matter for calculation of the damages incurred by 
GenBio as a result of Condie's and Yarter's attempted raid. 
n . APPELLANTS SHOULD BE SANCTIONED FOR FILING A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
GenBio recognizes, as it did in its opening brief (at 48), that the imposition of 
sanctions is appropriate only in egregious cases. E.g.. Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 
App. 1988). This is, however, an egregious case. 
Condie and Yarter have utterly disregarded a clear duty -- known to them (R. 587) 
— to marshal the evidence surrounding the trial court's factual finding that there was "no meeting 
of the minds." R. 1588. They now attempt to evade that obligation by blatantly misstating what 
the trial court actually held.4 The other issues they raise, moreover, are utterly without record 
or precedential support. This is, in short, a case that is "obviously without merit, with no 
reasonable likelihood of success, and which result[s] in the delay of a proper judgment." 
Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989). Sanctions are not only 
appropriate, they are virtually required.5 
A. Appellants Have Ignored (And Now Attempt To Evade) Their Clear 
Obligation To Marshal The Evidence 
Condie and Yarter informed the trial court that, "if parties dispute the existence 
of a contract, whether they had the intent to form a contract is a factual issue." R. 587 
4Compare App. Rep. Br. 3 (asserting that they challenge "the trial court's legal determination that 
the contract was not sufficiently definite because a meeting of the minds as to certain ancillary terms is 
required in order to have a binding agreement") with R. 1590 (trial court's findings) ("It is not necessary 
that the contract itself contain all the particulars of the agreement. The crucial question is whether the 
parties agreed on the essential terms of the contract. Extrinsic evidence considered by the Court to 
delineate the intent of the parties and the enforceability of the contract established that the minds of these 
parties did not meet on essential terms") (emphasis added). 
5Fife v. Fife. 777 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah App. 1989) (Rule 33, Utah R. App. P., "requires that we 
award attorneys fees" when "it is obvious from the record that the trial court's findings were not clearly 
erroneous"). 
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(memorandum in opposition to GenBio's motion for summary judgment) (emphasis in original) 
(citing O'Hara v. Hall. 628 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1981)). The trial court, after hearing all the 
evidence presented by Condie and Yarter, concluded that there was no intent to form a 
contract.6 As a result, any appellate challenge — as Condie and Yarter well know — required 
them to confront the trial court's adverse determination of a "factual issue." R. 587 (emphasis 
in original). Accord. Judge Norman H. Jackson, "Utah Standards of Appellate Review," 7 Utah 
Bar J. 9, 15 (October 1994).7 
Because the absence of contractual intent is unequivocally a question of fact, 
because appellate review of factual questions requires the appellant to marshal the evidence, and 
because Condie and Yarter flatly abdicated that responsibility in their opening brief, the 
Appellants now resort to outright evasion. They do not, they submit, challenge a finding that 
there was no meeting of the minds, but rather attack "the trial court's legal determination that 
the contract was not sufficiently definite because a meeting of the minds as to certain ancillary 
6E.g.. R. 1588 ("there was no meeting of the minds as to the specific terms of the agreement"); R. 
1589 ("the nature of the telephone conversations, letters, and subsequent negotiations between the parties' 
attorneys established the parties' intent to enter an agreement to negotiate a final contract, but that final 
contract was never signed or agreed upon by the parties"); uL ("The conduct of the parties and other 
evidence considered by the Court reinforced the Court's finding that a final agreement was not made"). 
7As Judge Jackson has stated in his exhaustive review of the marshaling requirement (7 Utah Bar J. 
at 15): 
The following cases contain examples of factual issues requiring a clearly erroneous 
standard of review. 
* * * 
(3) Whether a writing has been adopted as a final and complete expression of 
an agreement. Hall v. Process Instruments & Control. Inc.. 866 P.2d 604, 606 
(Utah App. 1993). 
(4) Whether a party had the requisite contractual intent. Fitzgerald v. Corbett. 
793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990). 
(Emphasis added); see also authority cited at GenBio Br. 25 & note 34. 
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terms is required in order to have a binding agreement." App. Rep. Br. 3. This is not what the 
trial court held. 
The trial court did not, as Condie and Yarter disingenuously assert, conclude that 
there must be "a meeting of the minds as to certain ancillary terms." App. Rep. Br. 3. Rather, 
the court held that: 
[i]t is not necessary that the contract itself contain all the 
particulars of the agreement. The crucial question is whether the 
parties agreed on the essential terms of the contract. 
R. 1590. Thus, the court did not make the "legal error" purportedly challenged by Condie and 
Yarter: the trial court found (as Appellants claim to argue) that a contract need not set out the 
"ancillary terms," only those that are "essential." App. Rep. Br. 3. The court simply concluded 
that, as a factual matter, the: 
[e]xtrinsic evidence considered by the Court to delineate the intent 
of the parties and the enforceability of the contract established that 
the minds of these parties did not meet on essential terms. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The trial court, in short, found that there was no meeting of the minds on such 
essential terms as price and the property actually sold. See generally GenBio Br. 29-35. As a 
result, Condie's and Yarter's claim that they are "not required to martial [sic, marshal] the 
evidence" (App. Rep. Br. 2) rests upon a glaring distortion of the trial court's factual and legal 
conclusions. This Court should not countenance Condie's and Yarter's attempted evasion of 
their appellate responsibilities. 
Condie's and Yarter's failure to properly mount their appeal has imposed 
significant costs upon GenBio. GenBio Br. at Attachment A (Affidavit of Richard G. Wilkins). 
Their response brief - by relying upon misstatement and evasion — demonstrates that they have 
no credible justification for that dereliction. This Court, furthermore, has shown no reluctance 
in dismissing appeals (and sanctioning appellants) who blithely disregard their marshaling 
obligations. Jackson, supra. 7 Utah Bar J. at 13-14 (citing authority).8 Both responses -
dismissal and sanction - are appropriate here.9 
B. Appellants' Appeal Is Utterly Unsupported In Law Or Fact 
Condie's and Yarter's complete failure to shoulder their marshaling responsibilities 
is sufficient — by itself — to warrant dismissal of their appeal and the imposition of sanctions. 
See generally GenBio Br. 48-49 (and authority cited therein). There is, however, additional 
justification for these results. "An appeal must be well grounded in fact or law." Backstrom 
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall. 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah App. 1988). The present appeal 
is neither. Even cursory review of Condie's and Yarter's response brief, which is not once 
supported by the citation of any relevant legal authority (Section 11(B)(1), below), demonstrates 
that this appeal is "readily recognizable as devoid of merit" and, therefore, frivolous. Hunt v. 
Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). 
1. The trial court found "no contract," not a lack of contractual 
specificity. 
Condie's and Yarter's principal contractual argument — and the only point of their 
appeal for which the response brief cites legal precedent — is that "[t]he agreement between 
C&Y Corporation and General Biometrics is sufficiently definite to constitute a binding 
contract." App. Rep. Br. 3-4. But, as noted above, contractual definiteness is not at issue here. 
8Accord, Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah 
App. 1994) ("Because Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the factual findings which 
it disputes, we decline to reach the merits of its appeal"); Fife v. Fife. 777 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah App. 
1989) (sanctioning appellant because "it is obvious from the record that the trial court's findings were 
not clearly erroneous"). 
9Condie and Yarter attempt to deflect attention from their default by claiming, without foundation, 
that GenBio has failed to "martial" the evidence on its cross appeal. App. Rep. Br. 17. Indeed, they 
assert that "[t]his is a classic case of the pot calling the kettle black." IcL However, as set out above 
(Section 1(A)), GenBio has marshaled all the evidence relevant to its cross appeal. 
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The court held, not that any agreement was too indefinite to be enforced, but rather that there 
was no agreement: "the minds of these parties did not meet on essential terms." R. 1590. 
The impact of the trial court's actual holding on Condie's and Yarter's obligation 
to marshal the evidence has been addressed above.10 The trial court's finding of "no meeting 
of the minds" rather than "indefiniteness," however, has further relevance to the legal propriety 
of Condie's and Yarter's appeal: it not only underscores their abdication of marshaling 
responsibilities, it also demonstrates that their appeal lacks even arguable legal support. 
The bulk of the legal authority cited in Condie's and Yarter's discussion of the 
merits of their appeal (e.g.. pages 3-10 of the response brief) stands for the twin propositions 
that (1) once a court finds that the parties intended to form a contract, the resulting agreement 
is presumptively definite enough to be enforced, and (2) contractual ambiguity does not arise by 
mere assertion.11 These principles, furthermore, are undisputed by GenBio. Neither contractual 
interestingly enough, Condie's and Yarter's response brief does belatedly attempt to marshal part 
of the evidence — but only those portions that arguably support their contractual claim. See, e.g.. App. 
Rep. Br. 5-9 (invoking expert testimony regarding the purported meaning of an "asset" sale); App. Rep. 
Br. Exh. B (balance sheet purportedly setting forth MRC's "assets and liabilities"). The fact that 
Appellants now deem it necessary to marshal the evidence in support of their contractual arguments 
undercuts completely their claim that they are "not challenging the trial court's findings of fact." App. 
Rep. Br. 3. They are, and their response brief shows that they know it. But the effort, in any event, 
is unavailing. Proper marshaling requires Condie and Yarter to produce - not just the evidence 
supporting their assertions — but all the evidence to the contrary. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 
1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). They have not done so. The meager effort in their response brief, furthermore, 
comes too late. Marshaling must be done at the outset of an appeal — not in a reply brief to avoid 
outright dismissal and sanctions. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc.. 872 P.2d 
1051, 1053-54 (Utah App. 1994) (appellants may not shirk their marshaling responsibilities and thereby 
constrain "appellees . . . to do the appellant's work, usually at considerable time and expense"). 
nApp. Rep. Br. 4-5, 9-10 (citing Application of Sing Chong Company. Ltd.. 617 P.2d 578 (Haw. 
App. 1980) (definiteness); Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 
1993), ceflL denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (ambiguity); Rand-Whitnev Packaging Corp. v. Robertson 
Group. Inc.. 651 F. Supp. 520 (D. Mass. 1986) (definiteness). 
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"definiteness" nor "ambiguity," however, are implicated by the trial court's factual conclusion 
that, in this case, there was no meeting of the minds and, hence, no contract.12 
The only other cases cited by Appellants stand for the unremarkable proposition 
that a contract need not include all collateral terms.13 The trial court, however, did not find 
a failure to agree on "collateral" terms, but rather that "the minds of these parties did not meet 
on essential terms." R. 1590 (emphasis added). 
To succeed before this Court, Condie and Yarter must establish -- contrary to the 
trial court's factual conclusion — that the minds of the parties did meet on all essential 
contractual terms. C£. R. 1590 ("the minds of these parties did not meet on essential terms") 
(emphasis added). None of the legal authority cited in their opening and response brief, 
however, even addresses the issue of mutual assent. Accordingly, all of the legal authority cited 
by Condie and Yarter is flatly irrelevant. An appeal that is prosecuted without any relevant legal 
nAll of the "definiteness" cases cited by Condie and Yarter involve fact patterns where the courts 
found, first, that the parties had mutually reached agreement. The courts, then, concluded that the 
agreements were definite enough to be enforced. See GenBio Br. 32-33 & n. 44. These precedents, 
therefore, are immaterial to this case. Here, the court found that "the minds of these parties did not meet 
on essential terms" - not that an agreement was too indefinite to be enforced. R. 1590. Nevertheless, 
Appellants insist that their precedent stands for the proposition that, "in determining whether an 
agreement is reached, the courts will favor the determination that the agreement was reached." App. 
Rep. Br. 5 n. 10 (emphasis in original). This, of course, is simply not the law. 
GenBio will not repeat at length the basic principles of contract law set out in its opening 
brief. GenBio Br. 29-31. It suffices to note that all relevant authorities - from the authors of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts to this Court ~ recognize that the existence of an agreement must be 
established by clear evidence; courts simply do not "favor the determination that the agreement was 
reached." App. Rep. Br, 5 n. 10. See, e.g.. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17(1) (essential pre-
condition to contract formation "is a manifestation of mutual assent"); Commercial Union Assoc, v. 
Clavton. 863 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah App. 1993) ("A meeting of the minds between contracting parties is 
essential to the formation of any contract"); Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah App. 1987) 
("Mutual assent of the parties is essential to create a binding contract"). 
13See App. Rep. Br. 10, citing Barker v. Francis. 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987); Nixon & Nixon. 
Inc. v. John New & Assoc. Inc.. 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982). 
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support surely is not "well grounded in . . . law." Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership, supra. 
751 P.2dat 1160. 
2. Appellants' "cash offer" arguments are factually erroneous, 
illogical and unprecedented. 
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of this appeal is Condie's and Yarter's dogged 
insistence that they tendered a "cash offer." App. Rep. Br. 11-12, Yarter admitted at trial that 
the offer involved "cash and credit." June 2 Tr. 182. And, while Appellants correctly note that 
there are no "cases" discussing their "cash offer" claim (App. Rep. Br. 11), that is only because 
no litigant in history has ever had the effrontery to assert that a note, payable over time with 
interest, constitutes payment in "cash." All relevant authorities, cited in GenBio's opening brief 
(at 37-38), uniformly establish that "[a] promissory note does not constitute a cash payment." 
70 CJ.S. Payment § 17(a) (1987). Appellants' studied repetition of an argument lacking both 
factual and legal support is frivolous. 
3. Appellants have conceded that their "apparent authority" 
submission lacks merit. 
Faced with the reality (established by the evidence marshaled by GenBio in its 
opening brief at 20-21, 37-39) that GenBio never permitted either Townsen or Gephart to make 
corporate decisions without board approval, Condie and Yarter are forced to make a significant 
retreat on their "apparent authority" submission. Because the board in fact approved every 
action taken by Gephart or Townsen, Appellants are reduced to whining that "both Mr. Gephart 
and Mr. Townsen had a great deal of control in the corporate decisions" and to grumbling that 
"[e]ven though certain [sic, all] actions may ultimately have been approved by the board of 
directors," the board merely "acquiesced." App. Rep. Br. 12-13. In so doing, Appellants 
effectively concede that their apparent authority submission lacks merit. 
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"[A]n agent's apparent or ostensible authority flows only from the acts and 
conduct of the principal." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 
(Utah 1988). As a result, apparent authority exists only when a corporation "has manifested [its] 
consent to the exercise of such authority or has knowingly permitted the agent to assume the 
exercise of such authority." Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd.. 855 P.2d 204, 208-09 (Utah 1993) 
(quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 80 (1986)). GenBio, as Condie and Yarter now grudgingly 
admit, never permitted Townsen or Yarter to make a corporate decision that was not ultimately 
ratified (or to use Appellants' crabbed prose, "acquiesced in") by the board of directors. App. 
Rep. Br. 13. 
Accordingly, as Condie and Yarter — both former members of that board — well 
knew, neither Townsen nor Gephart had the authority to sell GenBio assets without board 
approval. Appellants' continued advocacy of a position that they know to be without factual 
support — and which they cannot buttress with the citation of a single legal authority — is 
frivolous. Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership, supra. 751 P.2d at 1160.14 
14Condie and Yarter assert that they "did act in good faith and reasonably relied upon Mr. Gephart's 
assertion of authority," and argue that GenBio "conveniently ignores" an express finding of good faith 
made by the trial court. App. Rep. Br. 13, 14. The trial court's finding of "good faith," however, is 
beside the point: the "good faith" finding was merely a preliminary ruling that Condie and Yarter had 
established a prima facie case of negligent misrepresentation. June 9 Tr. 18-19. The trial court, 
furthermore, ultimately rejected the misrepresentation claim (along with the "good faith" finding invoked 
by Condie and Yarter) on the merits (R. 1599-1602) and Appellants have not appealed that final ruling. 
GenBio Br. 4 n. 6. 
Finally, even if Condie and Yarter did rely in "good faith" upon a purported assertion 
of authority, that fact does not revive their apparent authority claim. "Good faith reliance" does not 
create apparent authority. Rather, a litigant must first establish that a corporation has "knowingly 
permitted [its] agent to assume the exercise of . . . authority." Luddington. supra. 855 P.2d at 208-09. 
Condie and Yarter concede that GenBio's board, by "acquiescing" in all actions undertaken by Townsen 
or Gephart on behalf of the corporation (App. Rep. Br. 13), never "knowingly permitted the agent[s] to 
assume the exercise of . . . authority" without board approval. Luddington. supra. 855 P.2d at 208-09. 
As a result, Appellants' apparent authority claim must fail. 
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4. The findings are not inconsistent and Appellants are estopped from 
asserting the contrary. 
Condie and Yarter again assert (but, this time, without argument) that the trial 
court's findings are "complete[ly] inconsisten[t]." App. Rep. Br. 17. They also assert that they 
are not estopped from raising the alleged inconsistency of the trial court's findings. In fact, they 
claim that GenBio's estoppel submission rests upon "a blatant misrepresentation of the record." 
(App. Rep. Br. 15) (emphasis in original). Despite the stridency of Appellants' rhetoric, these 
submissions lack any reasonable foundation. 
The trial court's findings are not inconsistent. In rejecting Appellants' apparent 
authority arguments, the court concluded that neither Gephart nor Townsen had authority to act 
without board approval (R. 1587-88) and not one of the allegedly "inconsistent" findings 
conflicts with these rulings. In deciding GenBio's counterclaim, the court did not find that 
Townsen or Gephart had ever made an important corporate decision on their own and without 
board approval. GenBio Br. 42 & n. 61. The court merely found that, while Gephart and 
Townsen "exercised a great deal of control over the GenBio Board," none of this control rose 
"to the level of being a violation of law." R. 1593. 
Remand and retrial is required only when "inconsistent conclusions are 
irreconcilable." Paul v. Kunz. 524 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Ind. App. 1988). As just shown, the 
trial court's findings on Appellants' claim and GenBio's counterclaim are completely consistent: 
Townsen and Gephart had a lot of authority in operating GenBio, but they could not (and did 
not) act without board approval. GenBio Br. 42-43. Condie's and Yarter's inconsistency 
arguments lack palpable merit. 
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But, beyond the frail merits of their inconsistency complaint, Condie and Yarter 
should be estopped from even raising the claim. The fervor with which they protest this point, 
furthermore, speaks volumes regarding the merits of their appeal. 
As set out in GenBio's opening brief (at 40-41), a litigant "who has knowingly 
and deliberately assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings is estopped to assume a 
position inconsistent therewith to the prejudice of the adverse party." 31 CJ.S. Estoppel § 117 
at 610-611 (1964). Condie and Yarter assert that they are not estopped from arguing 
inconsistency because their prior assurances to the trial court regarding the propriety of the now-
allegedly-inconsistent findings dealt only with their "alter-ego" arguments which have "absolutely 
nothing to do with the findings of fact on apparent authority." App. Rep. Br. 16. Indeed, they 
assert that GenBio's estoppel argument rests on a "blatant misrepresentation of the record." 
App. Rep. Br. 15 (emphasis in original). Let's see. 
In their complaint, Condie and Yarter asserted (in their First Cause of Action) that 
GenBio was obligated to sell the IF A facility because "Gephart and Townsen . . . were 
empowered, at all relevant times, with both actual and apparent authority to act on behalf of 
GenBio to negotiate and agree to the terms of a contract." R. 5. In their Third Cause of 
Action, Condie and Yarter simply took their "apparent authority" arguments one step further: 
they argued that their purported contract should be enforced because Townsen and Gephart acted 
as the "alter ego" of GenBio. Specifically, Condie and Yarter alleged (R. 12): 
that during all relevant times one or more of Ventana's managing 
partners, including Gephart, sat on GenBio's board of directors, 
that through such partner(s) Ventana controlled and dominated the 
business of GenBio with respect to the sale of MRC to C&Y, and 
that any other member(s) of GenBio's board of directors failed to 
participate in any meaningful way in the board's decision with 
respect to the sale of MRC to plaintiffs. 
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In short, both the First (apparent authority) and the Third (alter ego) Causes of Action rest upon 
a single theory: that Gephart (and/or Ventana) "controlled and dominated the business of GenBio 
with respect to the sale of MRC . . . and that any other member(s) of GenBio's board of 
directors failed to participate in any meaningful way in the board's decision with respect to the 
sale of MRC." R. 12. 
The findings of fact that Condie and Yarter now claim are "inconsistent" were 
drafted by opposing counsel. GenBio objected to the findings because the "control" issues 
discussed therein were relevant "to Plaintiffs alter ego argument," which had not been reached 
by the trial court. R. 1406. Furthermore, GenBio pointed out that the findings were 
problematic "because the court concluded as a matter of law that there was no domination and 
control of GenBio by Ventana" (R. 1406) and, therefore, the proposed findings "contradict[ed] 
the court's ruling that as a matter of law Ventana and Mr. Gephart did not improperly control 
GenBio." R. 1407. 
In response, Condie and Yarter asserted that the proposed findings were not 
contradictory because they went "directly to whether the Plaintiffs had breached any of their 
fiduciary duties." R. 1531. Appellants repeatedly assured the trial court that the findings were 
relevant - not to issues of "alter ego" or "apparent authority" - but, rather, to GenBio's 
counterclaim for fiduciary breach.15 Indeed, they went so far as to assert that their proposed 
15
 Appellants argued: 
[A] finding that GenBio was operated with little regard for shareholders' 
interests goes directly to disproving the false allegations that Mr. Condie 
and Mr. Yarter breached their fiduciary duties to GenBio. [R. 1532] 
[T]hese findings which show a lack of regard for shareholder's interests 
directly disprove the Defendants' allegations that Mr. Condie and Mr. 
Yarter breached their fiduciary duties. This proposed Finding of Fact is 
highly relevant to the Defendants'counterclaims. [R. 1532] 
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findings had "nothing to do with Plaintiffs' alter ego argument." R. 1532. If so, the findings 
had "nothing to do" (R. 1532) with whether "Gephart . . . controlled and dominated the business 
of GenBio . . . [in such a way] that any other member(s) of GenBio's board of directors failed 
to participate in any meaningful way." R. 12 ("alter ego" allegations). 
On this record — where, in response to GenBio's express objection that the 
allegedly inconsistent findings "contradicted] the court's ruling that as a matter of law Ventana 
and Mr. Gephart did not improperly control GenBio" (R. 1407), the Appellants expressly 
assured the trial court that the findings had "nothing to do" (R. 1532) with whether "Gephart 
. . . controlled and dominated the business of GenBio" (R. 12) - Condie and Yarter should not 
be permitted to assert that the trial court must be reversed because, "[o]n the one hand, the court 
found no facts which evidenced Gephart's control" but "[o]n the other hand . . . found numerous 
instances in which Gephart exercised considerable control." Appellants' Opening Brief 33. 
Condie and Yarter expressly assured the trial court that its second set of rulings - which they 
now claim to be inconsistent on the "control" issue - had "nothing to do" (R. 1532) with 
whether "Gephart . . . controlled and dominated the business of GenBio." R. 12. 
The exercise of control over GenBio by Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen 
also disproves the Defendants' counterclaim that the Plaintiffs attempted 
to divert to themselves a corporate opportunity. . . . Mr. Gephart and 
Mr. Townsen were well aware of all opportunities which were available 
to GenBio and the MRC Division, but consciously chose not to pursue 
any of the opportunities for the MRC Division. In this light, it therefore 
is not possible for either Mr. Condie or Mr. Yarter to have diverted the 
corporate opportunity to themselves which in fairness and equity 
belonged to GenBio. [R. 1533] 
This Finding of Fact is relevant to the Defendants' counterclaims in that 
it disproves the allegations that Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter were able to 
force GenBio to enter a contract which was detrimental to GenBio. This 
Finding of Fact demonstrates the exercise of control which Mr. Gephart 
and Mr. Townsen exercised over GenBio and the inability of either Mr. 
Condie or Mr. Yarter to exercise control over them. [R. 1534] 
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GenBio's claim of estoppel does not rest upon a "blatant misrepresentation of the 
record." App. Rep. Br. 15 (emphasis added). It, instead, rests upon the blatantly inconsistent 
positions assumed by Condie and Yarter during the course of this litigation. Their willingness 
to engage in such tactics, however, is merely illustrative of their questionable conduct both in 
the lower court and on appeal. 
When substantive law and procedure are solidly against them (i.e.. on the 
"contractual enforceability" and "marshaling" arguments in Sections 11(A), 11(B)(1), above), 
Appellants simply reinvent (and distort) the trial court's actual rulings. When there are no facts 
or law to buttress their position (i.e.. the "cash offer" and "apparent authority" arguments in 
Sections 11(B)(2), (3), above), they press resolutely ahead - oblivious to the reality that a 
position on appeal must be well grounded in law or fact. Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership. 
supra, 751 P.2d at 1160. And, when confronted with the plain duplicity of their litigating 
posture on the trial court's purported "control inconsistencies," they accuse GenBio of "blatant 
misrepresentation." App. Rep. Br. 15 (emphasis in original). 
This Court should not condone Appellants' conduct. "Since a valid professional 
evaluation would reveal a complete lack of merit . . . and because of the otherwise 
unprofessional presentation of this case on appeal," Appellants and their counsel are subject to 
sanction. Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1990). Basic "fairness requires that they 
bear the costs" -- including GenBio's attorneys' fees - necessitated by the continuation of their 
frivolous litigation. Oneida/SLIC. supra. 872 P.2d at 1054; Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P. 
(authorizing the award of double costs and attorneys' fees). 
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CONCLUSION 
Condie and Yarter have plainly breached their fiduciary duties. They have, 
moreover, pursued an appeal which lacks a reasonable foundation in either law or fact. This 
case should be remanded to the district court for calculation of the damages owed GenBio as a 
result of these derelictions. 
Respectfully submitted this fa) day of November, 1994. 
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